Election security depends not only on reliable voting technology but also on the agencies that help protect election systems from cyber threats. Election cybersecurity agencies provide guidance, share threat information, and support incident response while respecting the authority of state and local officials.
In the United States, this work involves federal partners such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Election Assistance Commission. Their coordination helps safeguard election infrastructure while clarifying how responsibilities are divided before, during, and after an incident.
Why Election Cybersecurity Agencies Matter to Election Security
Election security depends on more than the reliability of voting machines. Election offices also rely on voter registration databases, election-management systems, networks, and public communications, all of which may face cyber risks. Protecting these connected resources requires expertise and coordination that many local offices cannot maintain on their own.
Election cybersecurity agencies help address this challenge by providing technical guidance, threat information, and support for preparedness and response. Their involvement can help officials identify vulnerabilities, understand emerging risks, and make informed decisions while keeping election administration under state and local control.
These agencies also connect election officials with broader cybersecurity capabilities and established channels for sharing information. That coordination can improve the speed and consistency of responses to incidents, while helping officials distinguish verified technical concerns from unsubstantiated claims.
Their value lies in supporting the security and resilience of election systems—not in determining election outcomes or replacing election administrators. Clear roles and trusted communication help protect the voting process and public confidence in its integrity.
Federal Agencies That Support Election Cybersecurity
Federal support for election security is distributed across agencies with distinct responsibilities. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works with election offices to assess cyber and physical risks, provide security guidance, and share threat information. Its services support state and local officials, who retain authority over election administration.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigates federal crimes, including malicious cyber activity that may target election infrastructure. It can receive reports from election officials and coordinate investigative information with relevant partners. Its law-enforcement role is separate from CISA’s assistance and risk-reduction work.
The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) supports election administration through guidance, research, and voluntary voting-system standards developed with the National Institute of Standards and Technology. It also helps election officials access resources and share practices. Together, these agencies form key parts of the federal network supporting Election cybersecurity agencies, while operational decisions remain primarily with state and local authorities.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the federal lead for helping protect the nation’s critical infrastructure, including election infrastructure. It supports state and local election officials with voluntary, nonpartisan security resources while those officials retain authority over how elections are administered.
CISA’s election security assistance can include:
- Cybersecurity assessments and guidance to help identify vulnerabilities.
- Technical support and incident response coordination when requested.
- Threat information sharing, exercises, and training for election personnel.
CISA works with election partners to strengthen defenses across systems such as voter registration databases, election-management networks, and public-facing election websites. Its support does not replace local responsibility for securing equipment, conducting elections, or certifying results.
As one of the principal Election cybersecurity agencies, CISA also helps officials access expertise and coordinate with relevant federal partners. Its assistance is designed to improve preparedness and resilience, not to direct election outcomes or determine whether an election result is valid.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) supports election security through its law-enforcement and counterintelligence missions. It investigates federal crimes involving election systems and works to identify hostile activity directed at election infrastructure, candidates, or political organizations.
When election officials or technical partners discover suspicious activity, the FBI can receive reports, assess whether a federal crime may have occurred, and coordinate investigative follow-up. Its work complements the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s protective and technical assistance; the agencies have distinct responsibilities.
The FBI also shares relevant threat information with election officials and other partners, subject to legal and operational limits. Reporting suspected criminal activity promptly can help investigators assess threats while avoiding public claims that go beyond verified evidence.
As one of the federal election cybersecurity agencies, the FBI does not administer elections or determine their outcomes. Election administration remains primarily a state and local responsibility, while the FBI investigates matters within its jurisdiction.
Election Assistance Commission
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is an independent federal agency created by the Help America Vote Act of 2002. It supports election administration but does not run elections or direct state and local officials, who retain primary responsibility for conducting them.
The EAC develops voluntary voting-system guidelines and administers a testing and certification program for voting equipment. It also provides election officials with research, technical resources, and information on topics such as accessibility, ballot design, and election administration practices.
For election cybersecurity agencies and local election offices, the EAC’s resources can inform decisions about voting technology and operational safeguards. Its guidance complements, rather than replaces, cybersecurity support from agencies such as CISA, and its voting-system certification does not guarantee that every part of an election operation is secure.
The commission also collects and shares information about election administration, including through its clearinghouse and support for state reporting requirements. This work helps officials apply consistent practices while accounting for differences in state laws and election systems.
How State and Local Election Officials Coordinate With Federal Partners
State and local election officials retain responsibility for administering elections, while federal partners provide support, threat information, and technical expertise. Coordination is generally voluntary and tailored to local needs; federal agencies do not direct how states conduct elections.
Officials may work through established channels, including state election offices, state chief information officers, and information-sharing organizations such as the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center. These connections help route requests and distribute relevant security advisories.
Coordination can include:
- Requesting risk assessments or technical assistance from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
- Reporting suspected criminal activity to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Sharing election-system information with federal partners and neighboring jurisdictions.
State and local officials determine what assistance is appropriate and follow applicable laws and procedures. Clear points of contact and timely reporting help Election cybersecurity agencies and election administrators coordinate without blurring their distinct responsibilities.
Core Cybersecurity Services for Election Offices
Election offices can use risk assessments to identify weaknesses in voter registration systems, election-management networks, polling-place technology, and supporting infrastructure. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) offers services such as vulnerability scanning and physical security assessments, subject to availability and coordination with the relevant jurisdiction.
Security guidance helps officials apply practical safeguards, including access controls, software updates, network monitoring, backups, and vendor-risk management. Election cybersecurity agencies provide resources and technical advice, while state and local officials remain responsible for decisions about their systems and procedures.
When a suspected cyber incident occurs, election offices can report it to appropriate federal partners and request technical assistance. CISA supports incident response for critical infrastructure, while the FBI investigates potential federal crimes; the appropriate response depends on the facts and jurisdiction.
Training and information sharing help election staff recognize phishing, follow incident-reporting procedures, and learn from emerging threats. These services are most effective when tailored to local systems, staffing, and election calendars.
Risk assessments and security guidance
Election cybersecurity agencies help election offices identify weaknesses before they can be exploited. Assessments may examine networks, voter-registration systems, election-management equipment, physical facilities, and procedures for handling sensitive information. The scope varies by jurisdiction and the services requested.
Federal partners, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), can provide technical assessments and practical guidance. This support may help officials review system configurations, access controls, backup practices, and plans for managing vulnerabilities. Recommendations are tailored to the systems and risks under review; they do not replace local responsibility for election operations.
Security guidance also translates technical findings into steps election offices can apply, such as limiting account privileges, keeping software updated, and protecting backups. Officials can use these measures to prioritize improvements in line with available resources and operational needs.
Assessments are most useful when treated as an ongoing process rather than a one-time check. Election cybersecurity agencies can share updated guidance as threats and technology change, while state and local officials decide how to implement it within their own systems and legal requirements.
Incident reporting and response support
When an election office suspects a cyber incident, prompt reporting helps authorities assess its scope and coordinate appropriate support. Officials can contact the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) for election-related cybersecurity assistance and report suspected federal crimes to the FBI. The appropriate channel depends on the incident and any applicable state or local procedures.
CISA can help analyze technical information, provide guidance, and coordinate response resources; the FBI investigates potential criminal activity. Reporting does not transfer control of election systems to federal agencies. State and local officials remain responsible for administering elections and deciding how to operate their systems.
Useful reports include the affected systems, when the activity was detected, observed symptoms, and steps already taken. Election offices should use established reporting channels and follow applicable procedures for handling sensitive information. They should avoid disrupting evidence or systems before consulting responders when circumstances permit.
Clear communication among election officials and federal partners can support investigation, containment, and recovery. Election cybersecurity agencies provide assistance within their respective authorities, while local officials make operational decisions and communicate with their communities.
Training and information sharing
Election cybersecurity agencies help election offices build practical skills for preventing, detecting, and reporting cyber incidents. Training can cover secure account practices, phishing recognition, access controls, incident procedures, and the safe handling of sensitive information. Programs should reflect the responsibilities and technical capacity of each jurisdiction.
Information sharing gives officials timely, actionable guidance on emerging threats and protective measures. Federal partners, including CISA, provide resources and channels for sharing information with state and local election authorities. Election offices can use these materials to update procedures and brief staff, while protecting sensitive operational details.
Useful training and information-sharing activities include:
- Tabletop exercises that rehearse roles, communications, and decisions during a simulated incident.
- Briefings on current cyber risks and relevant security advisories.
- Clear procedures for reporting suspicious activity to appropriate partners.
- Peer exchanges that allow election officials to share lessons and effective practices.
Election cybersecurity agencies support these efforts, but election administrators remain responsible for applying guidance within their systems and legal requirements. Clear points of contact and regular practice help make coordination more effective.
Protecting Election Systems Across the Voting Process
Election-system security begins well before ballots are cast. Election offices can inventory hardware and software, restrict access to voter-registration databases, apply security updates, and use multifactor authentication where available. Federal guidance and technical assistance can help jurisdictions assess risks, though local officials retain responsibility for administering elections.
During voting, protections depend on the method used. Jurisdictions may secure polling-place networks, limit physical access to voting equipment, maintain chain-of-custody procedures for ballots, and prepare backup plans for equipment failures. Paper records, where used, can support audits and recounts; they do not replace safeguards for the systems that create or manage election records.
After polls close, officials must protect results as they are transmitted, compiled, and reported. Reconciliation procedures, access logs, and post-election audits can help identify errors or unauthorized changes. Election cybersecurity agencies can provide guidance and incident support across these stages, while election officials verify results through established state and local processes.
Agency Roles in Addressing Foreign Influence and Cyber Threats
Election cybersecurity agencies address foreign influence and cyber threats through distinct but coordinated responsibilities. CISA shares technical threat information and defensive guidance with election officials, while the FBI investigates federal crimes and foreign cyber activity. The Election Assistance Commission supports election administration through resources and voluntary standards.
Identifying and sharing threat information: Agencies assess information from government, industry, and other sources, then distribute relevant alerts to state and local officials. Sharing can help election offices recognize risks such as phishing, ransomware, or attempts to access election-related networks. The details provided may be limited when investigations or intelligence protections apply.
Distinguishing cyber incidents from influence operations: A network intrusion or disruption is different from a campaign intended to mislead voters through false or manipulated content. Such activity may overlap, but it can involve different agencies and authorities. Election cybersecurity agencies focus on protecting systems and communicating verified information; they do not determine the truth of every political claim or control election outcomes.
Identifying and sharing threat information
Election cybersecurity agencies identify potential threats by combining technical indicators, law-enforcement findings, and reports from election officials. Information may concern attempts to access election networks, vulnerabilities in software or equipment, or suspicious activity affecting election infrastructure. A reported threat is assessed before it is treated as evidence of a confirmed compromise.
Federal partners share relevant, actionable information with state and local officials through established channels, including CISA’s election-security resources and information-sharing programs. The goal is to help officials understand what may be affected and take proportionate steps, while protecting sensitive investigative details and sources.
Useful information can include:
- Indicators of compromise, such as suspicious network activity
- Known vulnerabilities and recommended mitigations
- Alerts about threat activity relevant to election infrastructure
Election offices can also report unusual activity to appropriate federal partners. Timely, specific reports help agencies compare observations across jurisdictions and provide targeted guidance; information sharing does not, by itself, establish that an election system was breached.
Distinguishing cyber incidents from influence operations
A cyber incident involves an attempt to access, disrupt, alter, or damage election-related systems or data. Examples include unauthorized access to voter-registration databases, denial-of-service attacks on election websites, or interference with election equipment. Evidence of an incident does not, by itself, establish that votes were changed or that an election’s outcome was affected.
Influence operations use communication tactics to shape public perceptions or undermine confidence in elections. They may involve fabricated claims, misleading content, or the coordinated amplification of divisive narratives. Such activity can take place without any intrusion into election systems.
The distinction matters because the response differs: technical incidents require investigation and remediation, while suspected influence operations call for careful assessment and clear public communication. The two can overlap, but officials should not treat online claims alone as proof of a cyberattack.
Election cybersecurity agencies can help share relevant threat information and clarify what is known, while respecting the responsibilities of election officials and law enforcement. Precise language helps the public distinguish confirmed technical activity from unverified claims or attempts to manipulate perceptions.
Election Incident Response: Coordination, Communication, and Recovery
When a cyber incident affects election operations, local officials should follow established response plans, preserve relevant logs and evidence, and notify appropriate state and federal partners. Election cybersecurity agencies can help assess the situation, share technical guidance, and coordinate support while the jurisdiction retains responsibility for administering its election.
Clear, prompt communication helps officials distinguish confirmed facts from unverified reports. Updates should explain what services are affected, what voters need to know, and where authoritative information will be posted. Sensitive investigative details should be shared through appropriate channels rather than disclosed prematurely.
Recovery may involve isolating affected systems, restoring them from verified backups, and checking their integrity before returning them to service. Officials should also document decisions and assess whether contingency procedures—such as paper records or alternative processes—are needed to maintain voting and counting operations.
After the immediate response, participating agencies and election offices can review what happened, identify gaps, and update plans and training. This coordination helps strengthen preparedness without implying that every incident has the same cause, severity, or recovery timeline.
Limits, Responsibilities, and Accountability Among Election Cybersecurity Agencies
Election cybersecurity agencies provide support, but they do not control how states and localities administer elections. Under the U.S. system, election administration is primarily a state and local responsibility, so officials retain authority over voter registration, voting procedures, equipment, and certification, subject to applicable law.
Federal partners have distinct mandates. CISA offers voluntary security guidance and technical assistance; the FBI investigates federal crimes, including malicious cyber activity; and the Election Assistance Commission provides election-administration resources and administers federal grant programs. Their responsibilities may overlap in an incident, but no single agency directs every response.
Accountability depends on clear roles, lawful information sharing, and transparent communication with election officials and the public. Agencies must protect sensitive information and avoid overstating what is known, while state and local authorities remain responsible for operational decisions and election results.
Coordination also has practical limits: federal agencies cannot guarantee that every system is secure or replace local preparedness. Effective Election cybersecurity agencies support therefore relies on documented procedures, appropriate oversight, and candid reporting of incidents and corrective actions.
Strengthening Election Cybersecurity Partnerships for Future Elections
Stronger partnerships begin with clear, recurring coordination among federal agencies, state and local election officials, and relevant private-sector providers. Regular planning sessions and exercises can clarify who shares threat information, who leads particular response tasks, and how officials communicate with the public during an incident.
Election cybersecurity agencies can support this work by making guidance practical and accessible to jurisdictions with different staffing and technical resources. Shared training, tested response plans, and established channels for reporting incidents help officials prepare without compromising local control over election administration.
Partnerships also benefit from timely, consistent information sharing before and after elections. Reviewing lessons from exercises and real incidents can help agencies and election offices update procedures, address identified gaps, and adapt to changing cyber risks while protecting sensitive information.